ABSTRACT. Over the past decade, discussion has flourished among practitioners and academics regarding workers' rights in developing countries. The lack of enforcement of national labour laws and the limited protection of workers' rights in developing countries have led workers' rights representatives to attempt to establish transnational industrial relations systems to complement existing national systems. In practice, these attempts have mainly been operationalised in unilateral codes of conduct; recently, however, negotiated international framework agreements (IFAs) have been proposed as an alternative. Despite their growing importance, few studies have empirically studied IFAs. This paper starts to fill this gap by studying why corporations adopt IFAs, based on a qualitative study of the process leading to the signing of a recent IFA. The study's findings complement existing research into why corporations adopt IFAs, codes of conduct, and CSR policies by demonstrating that corporate motives can be linked to a desire to retain a trusting relationship with the labour union movement. In addition, the findings indicate that the discrete campaign model of stakeholder pressure dominant in previous research should be complemented by a continuous bargaining model of stakeholder pressure. The paper concludes by discussing differences between these conceptual models of stakeholder pressure and avenues for future research.
Introduction
Over the past decade, discussion has flourished among practitioners and academics regarding workers' rights in developing countries. As many have noted, national legislative frameworks in countries such as China and Vietnam are well developed (e.g., Chan, 1998; Cooney et al., 2002; Ding and Warner, 1999; Warner, 1996) . However, there are large gaps between labour law and corporate practice in most developing countries, especially in countries, such as China, with recently amended labour laws (e.g., Chen, 2003; Cooke, 2004; Cooney et al., 2002; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Lau, 2001; Liew, 2001; Zhu and Fahey, 1999) . In practice, this means that when transnational corporations (TNCs) offshore operations, mainly to Asian countries, they are involving themselves in national industrial relations systems characterised by only limited enforcement of workers' rights. This lack of enforcement of national labour laws and limited protection of workers' rights has led workers' rights representatives (both labour unions and non-governmental organisations) to attempt to establish transnational industrial relations systems to complement existing national systems (Anner et al., 2006; Esbenshade, 2001; Kuruvilla and Verma, 2006; Riisgaard, 2005) .
Attempts to establish transnational industrial relations systems have mainly taken two routes. First, as early as the 1970s (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2000) , but more forcefully in the 1990s and 2000s, workers' rights representatives have demanded linkagesbetween workers' rights and trade -initially in GATT and then in WTO (commonly known as the 'social clause' debate) (e.g., Bartley, 2007; Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005; O'Brian et al., 2000; van Roozendaal, 2002) . However, the limited success of these demands made workers' rights representatives direct most of their attention to individual corporations rather than international organisations, this second approach being operationalised by promoting so-called codes of conduct and international framework agreements (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Compa, 2004; Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005) . While codes of conduct are the transnational industrial relations system preferred by most NGOs and TNCs (Compa, 2004; Connor, 2004; Gallin, 2000; Guillén et al., 2002; Nijhof et al., 2003; Schlegelmilch and Houston, 1989; Sethi, 1999) , most labour unions and a few TNCs prefer an international framework agreement (IFA) system (Connor, 2004; Gallin, 2000; Hammer, 2005; Riisgaard, 2005) .
Codes of conduct and IFAs serve the same purpose, namely, to improve workers' rights, but represent different ways of governing workers' rights transnationally. Hence, the code of conduct versus IFA debate is fundamentally about alternative transnational workers' rights governance systems and about what CSR means in practice in the ongoing process of globalisation. In this debate, codes of conduct represent a unilateral and corporate-controlled workers' rights governance system, of which labour union representatives are sceptical, seeing it as a system of 'given' rights. Labour unions basically argue that codes of conduct are convenient public relations tools for TNCs, enabling them to prevent and 'crowd out' union involvement in workers' rights issues (e.g., Frundt, 2004; Justice, 2003; Lipschutz, 2004; Roman, 2004) . Instead of codes of conduct, union representatives prefer a workers' rights governance system built on negotiated firmunion IFAs that recognise the role of labour unions in promoting transnational workers' rights (EgelsZandén, 2008) . In addition to the symbolically important issue of the labour union movement's role in transnational workers' rights governance, there are also differences in the underlying logic of the code of conduct and IFA governance systems. First, codes of conduct envision governance driven mainly by consumer pressure (e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 2001) , while IFAs put more emphasis on the traditional union strategy of leveraging control of the labour supply. Second, codes of conduct envision governance driven by pre-established codified principles of workers' rights, while IFAs place a greater emphasis on the bargaining logic that underpins national industrial relations systems (cf. Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2007) . Hence, the code of conduct versus IFA debate involves both symbolic and substantial factors related to emerging transnational governance systems for workers' rights.
Workers' rights are integral to CSR and business ethics more generally, for example, being included in the UN Global Compact principles. Hence, the choice of a code of conduct or IFA transnational governance system has implications not only for workers' rights but also for the future development of related CSR issues, such as the link between human rights and workers' rights, the role of NGOs in business ethics, and the link between national and transnational governance systems. Despite this and the extensive research into codes of conduct, there are only a handful of studies examining IFAs. This almost exclusive research focus on codes of conduct exists even though the number of signed IFAs has been consistently and rapidly increasing (cf. Hammer, 2005) , making IFAs an important complement to codes of conduct. The sparse existing research into IFAs has also almost exclusively been conducted from union and NGO perspectives, providing limited insight into the central research question of what motivates corporations to sign IFAs. This paper addresses this gap, by explicitly focusing on corporate motives for adopting IFAs. This is done based on a qualitative study of the process leading to a recently signed IFA in a European TNC.
Previous research into international framework agreements
International framework agreements and codes of conduct serve the same purpose, namely, to improve workers' rights in corporations' own and their suppliers' factories (cf. Compa, 2004; Connor, 2004; Gallin, 2000) . The main difference between codes of conduct and IFAs is that while codes are unilaterally adopted by corporations, IFAs are negotiated and signed by both the corporation and representatives of the labour union movement. Hammer (2005) and 530 Niklas Egels-Zandén
